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Introduction
Traditionally, corruption is viewed and researched as an economic phenomenon and a problem closely related to the negative (shadow) economy [Geveling 2001: 45] . The spread of economic corruption in the public sphere means that some officials entrusted with government powers and the rights to dispose of resources related to public authority use them for the purposes of personal or group material enrichment.
To use public resources for personal or group material enrichment, it is necessary first to win, retain and monopolize public authority by creating an  Nisnevich Yu. A. Professor, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Department of Political Science
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897423 appropriate political regime. Corruption aimed at political gain may, among other things, be an instrument used for tackling of this problem.
These permit to view corruption not only as an economic one, but as a political phenomenon and a problem too [Rose-Ackerman 1999] and single out such its specific type as political corruption. Political corruption may be defined as the use by a person in a public office of entrusted to him or her government powers and rights, position and status in the system of public authority, the status of the public authority institution represented by him or her, for the purposes of illicit personal and (or) group (including in a third party interests) political gain (political enrichment).
In the course of fight for power via elections of candidates for public offices there may be singled out electoral corruption. Electoral corruption is defined as creation of advantages for representatives of ruling political forces and groups, suppression of their political competitors and distortion of free expression of citizens' will by illicit use of the structures of public authorities, respective public officials and resources in the course of the electoral process.
At the stage of the use of public authority by political actors who could seize it, political corruption may be identified as privatization of power. Privatization of power is defined as appropriation of all government powers and rights by the ruling political actors, complete removal of political opposition via legislative and other means of regulatory and legal formation of political order and rules, as well as appointments in the system of public authorities.
Eventually, political corruption always results in the formation of a corrupt political regime of authoritarian type and an convergence of political and economic corruption creating its highest complex form -state capture, where corruption acquires a systemic nature and becomes a base of government functioning […] .
Objectives
Objectives of the present research consist in analysis of conditions, genesis and process of growth of political corruption in the post-communist Russia, which has led to the authoritarian regime of the corporate type as the ruling political regime.
Methods
Methodologically the research is based on the new institutional approach which emphasizes institutional environment, fundamental political, social and juridical institutions, norms, relations and values. The basic tool of institutional analysis is even history analysis and politico-law analysis […] , which is a result of the development of the classical institutional method in contemporary world.
Nomenclature as a primary source of corruption
The nomenclature inherited from the Communist system by the new state, which had emerged after the USSR collapse in 1991, became the primary source of corruption in the post-communist Russia.
According to Djilas, the nomenclature is a new class ruling in socialist countries of party bureaucracy [Djilas 1957 ]. Voslensky, a researcher of the USSR nomenclature, had defined it as "an organized by Stalin and his apparatus 'guard', which has learned to rule" and as "the Soviet ruling class" [Voslensky 2005: 112] .
The nomenclature is a competitive social environment, where groups or clans formed on the base of family, education and production ties, community principles, national and social relations, fight for domination […] .
The nomenclature is a specific social stratum; its mechanism of functioning and vertical mobility is basing on the principle of personal loyalty to a clan and its leaders and, simultaneously, on the ability to timely climb on the bandwagon of the "winners", the group dominating in the current situation. The base of the nomenclature activity is the use of the authorities' administrative resources with the aim to secure personal material and social prosperity. However, exactly the abuse of the administrative resources, its wrongful use for purposes other than those of exercise of government powers and official duties needed to perform state functions and ensure the attainment of social development goals, i.e for getting some unjustified personal or group advantage, both material and immaterial gain, is the institutional mechanism of corruption in the public sphere […] .
Subsequently, corruption is a driving force of the nomenclature's activity.
According to Yakovlev, a former Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, just before the collapse of the Communist system in the USSR reigned "corruption, deception, disinformation", whereas "nepotism, bribery, embezzlement of state property have to some extent tainted practically all members of the nomenclature" [Yakovlev 2003: 564] . At the same time, the middle or lower strata, only starting to climb up the career ladder, of the Soviet party and economic management nomenclature, were interested in the fastest removal of the hardened top leadership and party bonzes, since it was the only way to ensure their prospects of fast career progress and advancement to the top echelons of power. Exactly this part of the Soviet nomenclature along with the comparatively small democratically spirited part of the Soviet society had become a driving force of the nomenclaturedemocratic revolution, which had place in the USSR in the early 1990s.
As a result of the failure of the August putsch of 1991, the conglomerate of the leaders of the democratic movement, the so called "first wave democrats" and the representatives of the progressive part of the Soviet nomenclature leaded by its typical representative Yeltsin, came to power in the new Russia. However, this conglomerate did not exist for long. The process of formation of the Russian nomenclature rooted in the Soviet nomenclature started yet in the course of the revolutionary events of 1991 -1993. This new nomenclature had rather early decided to take a road other than the democratic movement.
After coming to power, the representatives of the progressive part of the Soviet nomenclature started to recreate organically inherent in them nomenclature and corruption mechanisms in the Presidential and governmental structures of the post-communist Russia. The following circumstances facilitated such a regeneration of nomenclature methods of state administration and corruption-based relations in the public sphere.
Firstly, all elements of the Russian state machinery were from the very beginning staffed practically exclusively by officials, who had earlier workers of the party and government apparatus of the USSR and RSFSR. The "professionalism" of such officials was based on the mastery of the methods of bureaucratic workflow management, behind-the-scenes decision-taking and corruption-based interactions, as well as tricks of bureaucratic intrigues.
As it seems today, the mass employment of former officials of the Soviet party and economic management machinery across all structures and levels of the newly created system of public administration was one of the most serious errors of the new Russian government.
Secondly, a small number of representatives of the democratic movement initially present in the government structures put their stakes exclusively on personal support on the part of President Yeltsin. They did not consider necessary and paid no attention to the consolidation of the democratic movement as their long-term political base and candidate pool, to be used at least for a gradual replacement of the nomenclature-related officials in the government structures.
The nomenclature environment have incorporated and still incorporates only those accepting and to a sufficient degree mastering the rules and mechanisms of its activity. Yet in 1992 -1993, there were observed resignations of practically all well-known "first wave democrats".
The progressive part of the Soviet nomenclature transferring into the Russian nomenclature had achieved its main goal -it came to power in the country and could seize practically all levers of government.
The establishment of the Russia's nomenclature as the ruling stratum of the post-Communist Russia was helped by the process of the "Russia's way privatization" started since 1992, which was "95 per cent political and only 5 per cent economic issue" [Pirvatizatsiya po-rossiyski 1999: 350] .
At the start of the privatization process some part of the nomenclature representing the old cadres of the Soviet economic managers, first of all young party and Komsomol members, who had already got up an appetite for economic freedom in the course of the cooperative movement started in mid-1980s, and could successfully convert their nomenclature and corruption-related ties in the structures of the federal and regional authorities into the start-up capital and private property.
The fact that the "Russia's way privatization" was of the nomenclaturebased genesis was confirmed by Chubais, its main facilitator. "And as concerns our 'new Russians' -they are either from the old Soviet directorship with all its minuses and pluses. Or they are from former cooperators and such-like businesspeople brought forth by the perestroika. Or they are from the representatives of former regional political elites. All of them have their 'birthmarks'; however, real strategic owners are recruited from them" [Pirvatizatsiya po-rossiyski 1999: 63] . However, as it had turned out, the "new Russians" had the common "birthmark" -the nomenclature-corrupt one, and therefore they were never to become "real strategic owners".
Having improved in strength and accumulated sufficient financial and material resources in the course of the second cash privatization stage, which started in 1994 with the launch of, first, investment tenders, and, later, shares-forloans auctions, financial and industrial groups, which got control over the largest oil and natural gas, as well as mining enterprises as a result of these auctions, began to have noticeable influence on the public authorities, incorporate lobbyists of their interests in its structures and create new nomenclature-oligarchic groupings.
After the Presidential elections held in 1996, when Yeltsin was elected for his second term in office, the resources of the conservative part of the former Soviet nomenclature used in political struggle began to dwindle and it ceased to pose a real threat to the acting government. An inflow of former Soviet nomenclature cadres in the structures of public administration had intensified after the default of 1998. By the end of Yeltsin's second term in office, there were 77 per cent of representatives of the Soviet nomenclature among the state bureaucratic part of the Russia's nomenclature, whereas among its economic component such representatives made 41 per cent; at the same time, among businesspersons not related to the nomenclature descendants from nomenclature families made a significant part [Kryshtanovskaya 2005: 318] . Therefore, this nomenclature, being the primary source of first economic and later political corruption, became the main political actor at the Russia's political scene.
Genesis of political corruption
Political corruption in Russia had not manifested itself immediately after the collapse of the Communist regime.
The first State Duma elections held in the post-Communist Russia in 1993 simultaneously with a referendum on the draft new Constitution were free and fair.
In the course of the elections President Yeltsin and his team proceeding from the tactical premises of keeping a broader room for political maneuver took an "abovethe-fray" position.
The bacillus of electoral corruption first infected the organism of Russia's politics during the electoral cycle of Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 1995 -1996. By the time of the second State Duma (1995 -1999) elections held in May through June of 1995, there had been created a social and political movement "Our Home is Russia" led by Chernomyrdin, the incumbent Chairman of the RF government. This movement, "the motor of which was the ruling bureaucracy -a conglomerate of bureaucratic clans" was "in fact run by the Presidential Administration" [Korgunyuk 2007: 274] . This pseudo-political structure created from above by administrative methods as a tool for lobbying legislative interests of the ruling nomenclature was the first test of organizational formalization of a so called "party of power" in the field of the Russia's politics; this "party of power" became the dominating factor of the electoral mechanism and the party system at large. The first attempt to use the "party of power" had frustrated the hopes of its creators; it could get only 10.13 per cent of the total vote [Korgunyuk 2007: 276] .
At the same time, the second State Duma turned out to be the most opposed to the The first successful example of the use of administrative resources being at disposal of the public authorities to hold power was the Presidential election of 1996, especially the second round of this election.
In the course of this election the popular-patriotic bloc headed by Zyuganov, the KPRF leader, was opposed by the "party of power", which could gather all shades of Russia's centrists and a considerable part of the liberal flank around the incumbent President Yeltsin, whereas other political forces could only choose one of these main forces [Korgunyuk 2007: 351] . In order to counter the hypothetical threat of the conservative part of the Soviet nomenclature led by the KPRF there were used methods of administrative influence as well as information and propaganda-based manipulation and the administrative resources being at disposal of the public authorities.
As concerns the reelection of Yeltsin for his second term in office, a significant role was played by the "water truce" made with Chubais' participation between the most influential at that time financial and industrial groups in order to jointly finance and provide informational support via mass media controlled by them to the electoral campaign of the incumbent President. The key measure was the propaganda campaign in Yeltsin's support "Vote or lose"; in order to run it there were used "multimillion investments and a machine of unlimited manipulation of the public opinion" [Khodorkovsky 2005 ], there were used both private and public mass media, as well as official capacities and statuses of power of the President's supporters. By the time of the Parliamentary election of 1999, on the threshold of the change of the President, the ruling nomenclature experienced a split between federal and regional nomenclature-oligarchic groupings. Therefore, two opposing each other "parties of power" -a social and political movement "Unity" and "Fatherland -All Russia" participated in the election of deputies of the third State Duma (1999 Duma ( through 2003 . In order to create and support "Unity" at the Parliamentary election there were used administrative resources of the federal authorities, whereas "Fatherland -All Russia" relied on some part of regional authorities. However, in spite of the fact that the administrative resources used by to promote both teams of the "party of power" were not only split but also played against each other, it total the "party of power" had much more success as at the 
Establishment of political corruption as the base of functioning of Russia's political system
The establishment of political corruption as the base of functioning of the postCommunist Russia and privatization of public authorities had finally manifested themselves as the dominant of the political process as a team led by President Putin, genetically related to the Soviet special services, came to power.
The widening of the political corruption spiral and privatization of authority has started with the redistribution of power and property via abuse of, primarily, such types of administrative resources of public authorities as the regulatory, coercive, media and legislative resources.
As a matter of priority, there were used the regulatory resources related to appointments so the group that came to power could select and assign, by nomenclature-specific and corrupt methods, their loyal supporters, primarily, representatives of special services and affiliated persons, to key posts in the system of public authorities, as well as in the management of state-owned and controlled by the state corporations and firms belonging to the oil and natural gas complex, which formed the base of the Russia's economy. As a result of this process, the number of so called "siloviks", i.e. officers of special services, army and other paramilitary organizations, in the structures of Russia's public authorities increased more than two times, from 11. The creation of such an institution was the first step to implement a President Putin's project of consolidation of a "power vertical", which in its essence was the creation of a "dominant-power system" as defined by Carothers, in the framework of which "the long hold on power by one political group usually produces large-scale corruption and crony capitalism" [Carothers 2002 ].
After the team led by President Putin had come to power starts a new nomenclature and corruption-related repartition of property, the main tool of which was the abuse of the coercive resource at the disposal of the public authorities. The most illustrative and well-known example of this is the "YUKOS affair".
Due to the fact that the sphere of mass information was of a special political importance and the role played by information-based management increased dramatically, the mass media market was one of the first markets to experience repartition of property.
All large television and radio companies broadcasting on the federal level and a number of influential socio-political printed media slipped into state control or that of financial and industrial groups affiliated with the ruling authorities. There was observed a sharp decline in the number of alternative or not controlled by the authorities sources of information; in fact, although tacitly, there was introduced censorship. The total media resource concentrated in the way described above was used to informational and propaganda-based manipulation of popular consciousness and public opinion aimed at mobilization of society for support of the ruling authorities and informational discrediting and suppression of their political opponents and any political opposition at large.
The key factor of the establishment of political corruption was the use of the legislative resource at the disposal of the public authorities in order to monopolize and later privatize the power.
The first victims of the legislative offensive on political competition aimed at monopolization of the public authority were regional politicians.
In August of 2000, there was legislatively established a new order of formation of the Federation Council; according to the new procedure one member of the upper chamber of the Russia's Parliament representing the respective RF subject should be appointed by the highest official of such a subject and the second representative should be elected by the legislative body of this RF subject. The top officials and chairpersons of the legislative bodies of the RF subjects were deprived of the status of the Federation Council members they had had under the previous procedure due to their posts. Therefore, the heads of regions could not anymore directly influence the adoption of legislative and other state decisions at the federal level as legislators; as a result, they lost a significant measure of their political "weight".
Moreover, in July of 2003 there were introduced certain changes in the fiscal legislation; as a result, financial capacities the regional heads disposed of in order to influence the situation in their respective regions were constrained and those heads had to depend on the federal authorities.
As concerns the establishment of political corruption as the base of functioning of the Russia's political system, the decisive role played a special law on political parties adopted in July of 2001 [Zakon No. 95-FZ 2001] . The adoption of this law was the tipping point in the process of formation of the Russia's party system.
The law on parties had fixed and launched the mechanism of government regulation of the Russia's party system, thus presenting ample opportunities to administratively regulate the processes of creation, activities and liquidation of political parties. In fact, the law introduced an authorization-based, and not declarative, principle of state registration of parties based on a four-stage bureaucratic procedure. As the law enforcement practice had shown, such a procedure permitted the ruling authorities to prevent the creation and registration of new political parties, as well as liquidate parties they did not want to exist for some reason, rather easily, by using administrative influence on the federal and regional registration bodies.
From the time the law was adopted, the authorities had a possibility to intervene in the activities of the parties, to turn on power and coercive mechanisms to "sort out" the parties guided by the striving to recognize as lawful only the parties not threating to them and to prohibit opposition ones, thus creating, in essence, police structures any party should turn to in order to achieve legitimacy. 
Privatization of public authorities
The success achieved in the course of the developments described above should be consolidated in a way preventing the ceding of state power to any other party. Public authorities should be not just monopolized, but privatized as well in order to carry out the state capture. In order to achieve these goals, the legislative resource at the disposal of the public authorities was used even more intensely. Russia and, traditionally, LDPR were sparring partners for the United Russia. All parties permitted to participate in the elections had to preliminary agree, on the informal basis, the lists of their candidates with the Presidential Administration and exclude the nominees, which, for various reasons, were unacceptable for the Administration even if such developments undermined the electoral interests of the parties. Besides, the Presidential Administration controlled the financing of electoral campaigns of the parties carried out by business structures, which had to follow its recommendations or seek its agreement [Morar 2007 ].
The elections of 2007 were carried out in the framework of a scenario "referendum on support of Putin". The incumbent President Putin headed the list of candidates put forward by the United Russia; however, he preemptively made a public statement refusing to be a member of the party and waiving a deputy mandate. As its election agenda, the United Russia choose "Putin's plan", a compilation of the President's public statements.
The "referendum on support of Putin" was carried out by the system of public authorities of all levels, which used all types of its administrative resources and was in fact the "electoral machine" of the United Russia party. Eventually, the required result of the plebiscitary level was secured -according to official figures the United Russia party won 64.3 per cent of the votes and 315 deputy mandates (70 per cent) -well over the constitutional majority.
The system of public authorities of all levels also acted as the "electoral machine" of the candidate nominated by the government in place in the course of the Presidential election of 2008, which was also made a measure aimed at its plebiscitary legitimation.
A specific feature of this Presidential election was that according to provisions of the working Constitution Putin could not run for the third consecutive Presidency, whereas nomenclature-oligarchic groups needed to retain their representative in this position in order to stay in power. Therefore, in 2008 the changeover of the head of the state was carried out in the framework of "successor" scenario; a similar operation was successfully performed in 2000.
In the situation, where political competition was fully suppressed, the only intrigue of the measure staged in 2008 was the choice of the successor. So, when less than two weeks after the official start of the election campaign, on December 10, 2007, the TV cameras set in the Kremlin saw a piece of the political absurd theater, in the course of which Medvedev was announced as the "successor", the results of this measure became absolutely determined […] .
The "successor" should be nominated by the "United Russia" party. Two other Parliamentary parities -KPRF and LDPR -once again nominated their leaders as candidates. According to the legislation in effect, these three candidates were registered automatically. Out of 11 independent candidates, only two were permitted to collect signatures, only one of them was registered due solely to the fact that there was needed a technical candidate as insurance against possible derailing of the election.
In the framework of this event, the "electoral machine" of the authorities could ensure the triumph of electoral corruption -the "successor" Medvedev was Administrative pressure on voters was organized via the issuance of secret instructions across the whole hierarchy of the system of state and municipal authorities requiring them to support the "United Russia" party and the "successor". In order to fulfill the "electoral quota", at each level of the system of the public authorities there were used regulatory, institutional and status resources the aim being to place pressure on various social groups exerting the necessary electoral support. There were also used such methods of influence as administrative coercion, bribery, including bribery involving budget resources, threats to degrade social services and financial standing of socially unprotected, materially and administratively dependent groups of citizens; purposeful use of social and public utilities services in the electoral campaign (propaganda and voting according to the requirements set by the authorities); educational, cultural and enlightenment institutions; voting controlled by managers of enterprises and organizations with the use of absentee voting certificates at specially organized and closed polling stations.
The pressure on the participants in the elections had been placed even before the official launch of the electoral campaign with the aim to force candidates to withdraw from the election. Different methods -from persuasion to "coercion" -were employed. The method of persuasion presupposed that to make a candidate to voluntary withdraw from the election it would be sufficient that a public official compellingly recommend to such a candidate to do so. A voluntary-compulsory method was based on corruption-related ties, when an office in the structures of the public authorities, at enterprises or organizations controlled by the authorities, or a direct material remuneration in any form was offered as a compensation for the withdrawal from the election. The "coercive" requirement to withdraw included intimidation, persecution and obstruction to activities involving the public prosecutor office, law enforcement, tax and other regulatory bodies, as well as initiation or a threat of initiation of criminal investigations. Such methods were used not only against potential, but also against already registered participants.
A potentially vulnerable pressure point for all participants in the elections in Russia is the financing of electoral campaigns. In order to make enterprises belonging to the private sector to refuse to finance electoral campaigns of opposition political parties and candidates, and to make them voluntarycompulsory finance electoral campaigns of "United Russia" and the "successor", various methods of administrative pressure were placed on such enterprises. In particular, there were employed such methods as "compelling recommendations" on the part of officials, creation of administrative barriers, or, alternatively, provision of some preferences; "coercive" pressure was exerted via organization of inspections by law enforcement, tax and other regulatory authorities.
A significant influence on the results of the election had the infringement on the principle of equality in the course of election campaigning, especially on TV.
In the course of the electoral campaign "United Russia" and the "successor" obtained an unlimited access to the state-owned, municipal and controlled by the authorities electronic and printed mass media. There were used manipulative technologies to persuade voters that there was no other choice as official candidates, there were used the status resource and official positions of popular public officials being candidates from "United Russia", such candidates were included in party lists of "Untied Russia" as "locomotives". After the election, such "locomotives" rejected deputy mandates, what was direct electoral fraud.
However, the main person of the hypnotic show of mass zombification was President Putin. Since the day he came to power, the media resource of the public authorities had begun to be used for a demonstration, primarily on federal TV channels, of a multi-episode soap opera staged in the Soviet style, where the President was presented as the only savior of the state and the leader of the nation.
In order to achieve the required results, i.e. the plebiscitary legitimation, there were intensively used various methods of manipulation of the election results. In particular, there were employed such methods as: additional inclusion of voters casting their votes as ordered by the authorities in the electoral lists; organization of so-called "carousels" -multiple voting using one absentee voting certificate at different polling stations; stuffing of ballot boxes with sham bulletins, especially when mobile ballot boxes were used; infringements on the procedures of counting of bulletins and finalizing of electoral protocols; barring access of nonvoting members of the electoral commissions and observers wishing to recount votes; substitution of protocols on the results of the election at polling stations before they were entered into the computer system "GAS-Vybory"; and so on. In Exactly after this electoral cycle the ruling nomenclature used the legislative resource at the disposal of the public authorities, which it could privatize, to introduce changes in the Constitution in effect with the aim of a long-term strengthening of its dominant position. In December of 2008, there was adopted the first law changing the Russia's Constitution; in accordance with the amendment, the Presidential term in office was increased from four to six years, whereas the State Duma should be reelected after five instead of four years.
Conclusion. Protests and Falsifications
As a result of political corruption, which grew in the post-Communist Russia since the early 2000s, a corrupt authoritarian regime of the corporate type has formed as the ruling government of the country, and state capture was carried out by nomenclature and oligarchic groupings, which could privatize the public authorities under the aegis of President Putin. Political and economic corruption became the basis of the state functioning.
However, having achieved the summit of privatization of the public authorities, the ruling nomenclature faced the problem of democratic legitimacy arising only when people recognize the fairness of those rational and democratic procedures, which serve as the base of the formation of the system of power [Beetham 1991 ]. with the use of political corruption, to formally retain their juridical legitimacy; however, they clearly lost their democratic legitimacy, this development being fraught with dire political cataclysms in the future.
